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CASES NOTED
NEGLIGENCE, HUSBAND AND WIFE
In an action brought by a father to recover under the Florida Wrong-
ful Death Statute,' which statute allows the father to maintain an action
for loss of services and the mental suffering of both the mother and father
occasioned by the death of a minor child, held, the contributory negligence
of the mother is a bar to the entire action. Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So.2d 587
(Fla. 1955).
Three possible solutions to the question involved in this case were
available to the court. The mother's contributory negligence could act,
(1) as a bar to her share only, (2) as a total bar, or (3) as no bar at all.
The great majority of jurisdictions hold that the contributory negligence
of one or more of several beneficiaries will not defeat a cause of action
for wrongful death so as to bar all recovery, if the other beneficiaries are
innocent. 2 Most of these jurisdictions hold that the amount of the recovery
will be reduced to the extent of the contributorily negligent beneficiary's
share.3  The reasoning behind these decisions seems to be a reluctance
to impute the negligence of one beneficiary to the others.4
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1953).
2. Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (D.C. Pa. 1947); Bowler
v. Roos, 213 Cal. 484, 2 P.2d 817 (1931); Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co.,
53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Happy Valley Farms v. Wilson, 192 Ga. 830,
16 S.E.2d 720 (1941); Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456 (1940); Cruse v.
Dole, 155 Kan. 292, 124 P.2d 470 (1942); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32
N.W.2d 291 (1948); Los Angeles & S. L. R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123
P.2d 224 (1942); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939); Pearson v.
National Manufacture and Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S.E.2d 811 (1941); Gaus
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 56 Ohio App. 299, 10 N.E.2d 635 (1937); Lakeview, Inc. v.
Davidson, 166 Okla. 171, 26 P.2d 760 (1933); MacDonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589,
78 Pac. 753 (1904); Nettles v. Southern Ry., 211 S.C. 187, 44 S.E.2d 321 (1947);
Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 70 S.D. 352, 17 N.W.2d 700 (1945); Anderson v.
Memphis Street Ry., 143 Tenn. 216, 227 S.W. 39 (1920); Danville v. Howard, 156
Va. 32, 157 S.E. 733 (1931); Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co., 127 W. Va. 286,
32 S.E.2d 276 (1944).
3. Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (D.C. Pa. 1947); Phillips
v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Cruse v. Dole,
155 Kan. 292, 124 P.2d 470 (1942); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d
291 (1948); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939); Pearson v. National
Manufacture and Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S.E.2d 811 (1941); Gans v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 56 Ohio App. 299, 10 N.E.2d 635 (1937); Anderson v. Memphis
Street Ry., 143 Tenn. 216, 227 S.W. 39 (1920); Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32,
157 S.E. 733 (1931); Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co., 127 W. Va. 286, 32 S.E.2d
276 (1944).
4. Bowler v. Roos, 213 Cal. 484, 2 P.2d 817 (1931); Phillips v. Denver City
Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458. 128 Pae. 460 (1912): Lindlev v. Sink. 218 Ind. 1, 30
N.E.2d 456 (1940); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939); Pearson v.
National Manufacture and Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S E.2d 811 (1941); Lakeview
v. Davidson, 166 Okla. 171, 26 P.2d 760 (1933); MacDonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore.
589, 78 Pae. 753 (1904); Home v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 177 S.C. 461, 181
S.E. 642 (1935); Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 70 S.D. 352, 17 N.V.2d 700 (1945);
Andeson v. Memphis Street Ry., 143 Tenn. 216, 227 S.W. 39 (1920).
AIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
lowever, the lllinois rule is that thc contributory negligence of one
beneficiary acts as a total bar to the action.? This rule is bascd on the
theory that the damages are indivisible. The Illinois court says that thcre
is a single cause of action and a single assessment of the damages in a
gross sum. 6
The third view allows full recovery despite the contributory negligence
of one of the beneficiaries.7 This theory is based oii interpretation of the
statutes. Thus, where the statute does not provide that contributory
negligence shall act as a bar to the action, some courts vill not add this
provision.8 Again, where the right of recovery is only conditional upon
the deceased's right of recovery had he lived, some courts reason that
the beneficiary's negligence would not have acted as a bar to the deceased's
action and therefore should not limit his own action for the deceased's
wrongful death.?
At first blush it appears from the Klepper case1 0 that Florida has
followed the Illinois rule. Howcvcr, the same result is rcached in juris-
dictions following the majority view by applying the doctrine of imputed
negligence.' T1he general rule is that the marital relationship does not
constitute a sufficient basis for imputing to one spouse the negligence of
the other.'2 Where it is found, however, that the negligent spouse was
acting as the agent of the other spouse' 3 or of the community14  (in
5. Peterson v. Cochran & McCluer Co., 308 I1l. App. 438, 31 N.E.2d 825 (1941);
Carnhart v. Reeves, 288 Il. App. 159, 5 N.E.2d 855 (1937); Hazel v. Ioopeston-
Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 NE. 392 (1923).
6. Ibid.
7. Wilmot v. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61 Aft. 1069 (1905); Danforth v.
Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 At]. 821 (1924); O'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 301
Mass. 145, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938); Hines v. McCullers, 121 Miss. 666, 83 So. 734
,(1920); Reynolds v. Thompson, 215 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1948); Herrell v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929); McKay v. Syracuse Rapid
Transit Ry., 208 N.Y. 359, 101 N.E. 885 (1913).
8. Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Mie. 156, 126 Atl. 821 (1924); O'Connor v.
Benson Coal Co., 301 Mass. 145, 16 NE.2d 636 (1938); McKay v. Syracuse Rapid
Transit Ry., 208 N.Y. 359, 101 N.E. 885 (1913).
9. Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 At]. 821 (1924); I-ines v. McCullers,
121 Miss. 666, 83 So. 734 (1920); McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 208 N.Y.
359, 101 N.E. 885 (1913).
10. Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
11. Agdeppa v. Clougie, 71 Cal. App. 2d 463, 162 P.2d 944 (1945); Wheat's
Adm'r. v. Cray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S. W.2d 400 (1949); Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania
Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 At]. 269 (1915); Nichols v. Nashville Housing Authority, 187
Tenn. 683, 216 S.W2d 694 (1949); accord, Phillips v. 1)cnver City Tramway Co., 53
Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Los Angeles & S. L. R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61
Nev. 214, 123 P.2d 224 (1942); MacDonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 78 Pac. 753
(1904).
12. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912);
Bessett v. Hackett, 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953); Los Angeles & S. L. R.R. v. Umbaugh,
61 Nev. 214, 123 P.2d 224 (1942): Lakeview. Inc. v. Davidson. 166 Okla. 171,
26 P.2d 760 (1933); MacDonald v. O'Reillv, 45 Ore. 589, 78 Pac. 753 (1904); Danville
v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S.E. 733 (1931)..
13,. Cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Dull v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rv., 27 Cal. App. 2d 473, 81 P.2d 158 (1938);
Ostheller v. Spokane & I. E. R.R . 107 Wasi. 678, 182 Pa. 630 (1919); Crevelli
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66 (1917).
CASENOTES
community property states) in the matter at hand, the negligence is
imputed to the innocent spouse barring the recovery of both. 15
Florida has never before ruled on the issue presented by the instant
case. The few cases in this jurisdiction considering the question of imputed
negligence' indicate there was no doubt that Florida adhered to the
principle that the marital relation, in itself, has no effect in imputing
negligence to the other spouse.17  In this case did the court apply the
Illinois view, did they combine the majority view with the doctrine of
imputed negligence, or did they conclude that the father himself was
also contributorily negligent? It appears they tried to apply all three.
They specifically point out that the recovery is indivisible.' 8  Almost as
clear is their implication that in caring for the children the mother is
acting as her husband's agent." ' Then, in conclusion, the court states the
rule as being that ". . . it is proper . . . to assert against the father the
defense of contributory negligence grounded upon the negligent acts or
failure to act of the wife and mother of which the father has knowledge
or should have had knowledge."2 0 (Emphasis added)
The charge to the jury was to the effect that if the mother of the
deceased child was guilty of negligence that proximately contributed to
causing the accident and injury, the jury should return a verdict for the
defendant.2 1 In holding this charge proper it appears the Florida Supreme
Court either followed the lilinois rule, decided as a matter of law
that in caring for the children the mother was acting as the father's
15. American Jurisprudence states the rule thusly:
... (T)he rule supported by the majority of cases is that the negligence of
one parent contributing to the death of a child is not to be imputed to the
other parent . . .where the negligent parent is not the agent of the other
beneficiary in the matter in hand and where they are not jointly engaged in
the prosecution of a joint enterprise. 'The mere fact that, incidently, the
negligent spouse may derive some benefit from a recovery by the other does
not effect the rule. 16 AM. JUtR., Death § 135 (1938).
16. Arline v. Brown, 190 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1951); Sea Board Air Line Ry. v.
Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927); Tampa Electric Co. v. Bazemore,
85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923).
17. "But there appears to be little or no dissent to the proposition that the
negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to the wife unless he is her agent
in the matter in hand, or they are jointly engaged in the prosecution of a common
enterprise. The mere existence of the marital relation will not have the effect to
impute the negligence of the husband to the wife." Sea Board Air Line Ry. v. Watson,
94 Fla. 571, 579,, 113 So. 716, 719 (1927).
18. "It should be noted.that the recovery is ... indivisible; that is to say, there
is no apportionment between the parents. The father alone is . . . permitted to
recover one sum which serves as compensation for his own suffering and also for
the suffering of his wife." Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1955).
19. ". . . [SIo far as the father is concerned in the normal family relationship
it cannot be denied that in his absence and oftentimes in his presence, he recognizes
the peculiar qualities of the mother to car for and suprvise the conduct of an infant
and to that extent he endows her with all of the authority that he himself might
enjoy and otherwise assert in the matter of supervising he child and its conduct."
Klepper v. Breslin. 83 So.2d 587, 593 (Fla. 1955).
20. Id. at 593.
21. Id. at 590.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
agent, ' ' or decided as a matter of law that the father's knowledge of tle
mother's negligence constituted contributory negligcncc on his part.
It this case of first impression the Florida Supreme Court seens
needlessly to have missed the opportunity to clarify its position. Without
weighing the merits of the conflicting views, it appears, none the less,
that a clear alignment with one of the lines of authority would have been
a positive good in and of itself.
FRANK MPI. DUSBAUGII III
LAST CLEAR CHANCE-COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her husband arising out of
a collision between the deceased's truck and the defendant's train. The
jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff based on the judge's charge embodying
th doctrine of last clear chance. On appeal, reversed. Held, the doctrine
of last clear chance no longer applies to railroad comparative negligence
cases.' Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956).
At common law, when a defendant is successful in establishing the
defense of contributory negligence, it serves as a complete bar to recovery.2
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff
has led to various efforts to avoid it. The most commonly accepted modi-
fication of the strict rule of contributory negligence is the doctrine of
last clear chance,' which had its origin in 1842 in the English case of
Davies v .Mann.4 The rationale of the doctrine is that the last wrongdoer
is necessarily the worst wrongdoer, or at least the decisive one, and should
pay.5 An entirely different approach used to avoid the complete bar of
contributory negligence and last clear chance is the doctrine of comparative
22. See Agdeppa v. Clougie, 71 Cal. App. 2d 463, 162 P.2d 944 (1945); Wheat's
Adm'r. v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W.2d 400 (1949); Darbrinsky v. Pennsylania Co.,
248 Pa. 503, 94 AtI. 269 (1915 ; Nichols v. Nashville Housing Authority, 187 Tenn.
683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949). Contra, Phillips v. Denver City Trarnway Co., 53 Colo.
458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Ierrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry, 324 Mo. 38,
23 S.W.2d 102 (1929); Los Angeles & S. L. R.R. v. Urnbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123
P.2d 224 (1942); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (19 39 ), MacDonald
v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 78 Pac. 753 (1904); Home v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
177 S.C. 461, 181 S.E. 642 (1935).
1. By statute in Florida (FLA. STAT. § 768,06 (1953] the doctrine of comparative
negligence is applied in railroad cases.
. . . If the plaintiff and the agents of the [railroad] company are both at
fault, the former may recover, but the amount of recovery shall be such a
proportion of the entire damages sustained as the defendant's negligence bears
to the combined negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant.
2.. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 467 (1934).
3. The most often stated explanation of the doctrine of last clear chance is
that if the defendant has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's
negligence is not a proximate cause of the result. Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn.
109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912); Rottman v. Beverly. 183 La. 947, 955, 165 So. 153 (1936);
Fuller v. Illinois Central Ry., 100 Miss. 705. 716. 56 So. 783 (1911); Bragg v, Central
New England Ry., 228 N.Y. 54. 126 N.E. 253 (1920).
4. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
5. PROSSER, TORTS at 292 (1955).
